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Abstract—We develop and evaluate a methodology for running
manual implicit and explicit Demand Response campaigns in
order to improve the sustainability of smart grids. Initially, we
introduce a flexibility profiling engine that relies on the correla-
tion among end-user’s consumption, prices and environmental
conditions. Then, we investigate two mechanisms so that an
Aggregator, acting as an intermediate between the Distribution
System Operator or Retailer and the consumers, achieves the
desired demand flexibility. More precisely we introduce: (i)
a price-based mechanism that determines the new price that
consumers will be paying during the DR campaign, and (ii) a
reward-based mechanism that determines which set of consumers
should participate in the campaign, along with the load flexibility
to be asked from each one and the reward offered. The proposed
methodology is evaluated using a publicly-available dataset. It is
shown that CES model achieves high accuracy and that the details
obtained using the proposed mechanisms are more favorable than
the equivalent used.1
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the concept of smart grid has begun to mate-
rialize, leading to more flexible and reliable power distribution
systems. In this setting, Demand Response (DR) methods
constitute a core element, transforming end-users from passive
consumers to active grid actors, that play a significant role
in the operation of the distribution grid. Consumers that
participate in DR campaigns modify their electricity usage
in response to time-based rates or other forms of financial
and/or behavioral incentives, at times of high wholesale market
prices, when the system reliability is jeopardized or in order
to achieve certain environmental benefits.
In this context, this paper proposes a methodology for
running implicit (price-based) and explicit (reward-based) DR
campaigns. A flexibility profiling engine is developed that
produces a profile for each end-user, reflecting real-time de-
mand flexibility as a function of multiple parameters, such as
environmental context/conditions, energy retail prices at peak
and off-peak periods and individual/group preferences. End-
users are characterized by their price elasticities, i.e. (i) own-
price elasticity of demand that is a measure of load curtailment
and (ii) elasticity of substitution that measures load shifting,
weather sensitivity and other end-user and period (peak, off-
peak) specific constant parameters.
1This research has been partly funded by the European Unions Horizon
2020 research and innovation programme under the grant agreement N 646184
NOBEL GRID.
The proposed engine is based on the Constant Elasticity
of Substitution (CES) model [1], that will be described in the
sequel. Based on the calculated elasticities the proposed model
is able to predict changes in load consumption as function of
the prices and the temperature and vice versa, i.e. the engine
can estimate the pricing structure that is capable to achieve
the utility-defined objectives for peak load alleviation, under
a given set of temperatures.
Based on flexibility profiling engine’s capabilities two
mechanisms for running DR campaigns are proposed. One for
implicit DR campaigns that can be employed by an Aggregator
for helping a Retailer in estimating the new retail price that
should be announced to consumers enrolled in a dynamic
pricing program, so that the desired demand reduction is
met. In addition, we describe a mechanism for explicit DR
campaigns that enables an Aggregator to select the subset
of consumers for possible load curtailment, decide on the
portion of load to curtail from each one of them and calculate
personalized rewards that will appropriately compensate end-
users for the incurred loss in their net benefit.
The proposed methodology is evaluated using a publicly
available data set from a dynamic pricing program that was
extensively applied in London [2]. We round out this work
by providing information regarding the data preprocessing
we performed, along with simple approaches for calculating
missing core elements of the CES model, such as individual
end-user baseline, when dealing with an incomplete data set.
This evokes the assumption that
A. CES model motivation and other approaches
A large number of empirical studies deals with price
elasticities of residential electricity demand based on data
from dynamic-pricing pilot programs applied both in US and
Europe: e.g. see [3] and [4]. The data sets used in these studies
usually include repeated observations of time-varying elec-
tricity prices and respective electricity consumption, without
consumer’s budget constraints. The aforementioned context
evokes the assumption of homothetic separability in consumer
preferences, i.e. the ratio of peak to off-peak consumption does
not depend on the amount being spent on electricity, but on rel-
ative electricity prices only. Thus, in order to estimate demand
functions that are consistent with the theory of consumer’s util-
ity maximization (a typical assumption in microeconomics),
2we need to assume that the household decides the total to
be spent on electricity along with how much to spend on
other commodities. This evokes the assumption of homothetic
separability in consumer preferences, i.e. the ratio of peak to
off-peak consumption does not depend on the amount being
spent on electricity, but on relative electricity prices only. The
CES model allows the elasticity of substitution to take on any
value, it has been found to be well-suited to TOU pricing
studies [4] and is computationally simple.
The authors in [5] and [6] use CES model to estimate price
elasticities during summer period in a pilot site in Califor-
nia and in Baltimore, respectively. Their results reveal the
effectiveness of dynamic pricing, i.e. end-users actually reduce
their peak period loads and these reductions do not wear off
when the pricing plans are implemented over two consecutive
summers. In addition, the work presented in [7] uses CES
model to estimate price elasticity of large commercial or
industrial users that participate the first large-scale application
of real-time pricing in a competitive retail market in the U.S.
B. DR campaigns and incentives for participation
There are two broad categories of DR schemes; Automated
methods that rely on smart devices that can be remotely
controlled [8], as well as Manual ones where end users decide
whether to conform to the incoming signal or ignore it. In this
paper we focus on the latter type of DR campaigns, which can
be further clustered into (i) Implicit DR, i.e. price-based and
(ii) Explicit DR, i.e. reward-based. Implicit DR schemes refer
to dynamic retail pricing schemes that guide consumers to-
wards reducing their demand when prices are high, while they
reduce their electricity bill. The work presented in [9] presents
incentive-based consumption scheduling solutions towards this
goal. Reward-based incentives, on the other hand, give either
financial incentives to users for curtailing their load during
peak-demand [10], or promote collaboration and competition
for encouraging renewable and sustainable energy use and pro-
environmental behaviour more broadly [11].
II. FLEXIBILITY PROFILING ENGINE
In this work, we study a flexibility profiling engine that
is based on CES model and relies on the correlation among
end-user’s consumption, prices and environmental conditions.
The proposed engine generates price elasticity profiles, i.e.
each endpoint i is characterized by its own-price elasticity
of demand, elasticity of substitution, weather sensitivity and
other endpoint and period (peak, off-peak) specific constant
parameters that will be analyzed in the sequel.
Own-elasticity εi, measures the reduction of the consumer’s
demand in a certain time interval due to the increase in the
price of that interval. It is always negative; usage goes down
as price goes up. The own-price elasticity equation is:
ln qpki = ni + εi ln pk + δiHDH
pk
i , (1)
where: pk is the applied dynamic price during a certain
time interval, qpki is the respective demand of end-point
i, δi is weather sensitivity, ni is a period constant term,
HDHpki = H ×BT pki −T+i is the number of heating degree
hours (HDH) of end-point i, taking into account the average
outside temperature Ti at the premises of consumer i and
the base temperature BT pki (see section III-A) and H is the
duration in hours of the period during which the price pk is
applied. Note that own-elasticity is calculated separately for
peak and off-peak period.
Elasticity of substitution σi, in the energy domain, is a
measure of load shifting and reflects the rebound effects that
possibly take place after a change in price during the previous
period(s). More formally, is defined as the relative change in
usage in the two periods (e.g., the ratio of the peak to off-peak
usage) for a certain percentage of change in the relative prices
in those periods (the ratio of the off-peak to peak price). Note
that the price term uses the inverse price ratio, which is why
substitution elasticities are positive (e.g., a higher peak price
decreases the off-peak to peak price ratio, causing the peak
load to be reduced, and therefore the peak to off-peak load
ratio to decline). In the sequel, we will denote peak period with
p and off-peak period with op. The elasticity of substitution
equation is presented below:
ln
qpi
qopi
= αi + σi ln
popk
ppk
+ βi(HDH
p,ppk
i −HDHop,p
op
k
i ) ,
(2)
where: βi is weather sensitivity and αi is a constant term.
A regression model is applied to Equations 1 and 2 in order
to calculate the elasticity profiles for both peak and off-peak
period. Then, based on these elasticity profiles the flexibility
profiling engine can project peak and off-peak period loads
for each end-user i, for certain dynamic prices applied and
outside temperatures. More details can be found in [1].
III. ACCURACY
A. Dataset
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed
flexibility profiling engine a dataset from a dynamic pric-
ing program that was applied in a large (∼ 1100) num-
ber of households (endpoints) in London, from 01/01/2013
until 31/12/2013 was used. This dataset included half-
hourly consumption data for each endpoint (no sub-metering
data were available) for each of the three different price
bands. More specifically, three price bands were used:
p0 = 0.1176£/kWh, p1 = 0.0399£/kWh and p2 =
0.672£/kWh as baseline, low and high price, respectively.
Preprocessing was performed on the dataset in order to
estimate for each day and for each endpoint: (i) for the 6-
hour peak period (17:00 – 23:00) and (ii) for the 18-hour
off-peak period (23:00 – 17:00), the average price that was
applied and average outside temperature, respectively. Thus,
after preprocessing, the data we obtained included for each day
of the year 2013, for each endpoint and for both peak and off-
peak period the time stamped aggregated energy consumption
data from the energy meter, the average value of the applied
dynamic price and the average outside temperature.
B. Projection of peak and off-peak period loads
1) Training of the flexibility profiling engine: From the one-
year dataset presented in the previous section we considered a
3two-month training period, from 01/02/2013 until 31/03/2013.
By making use of this subset we calculated the elasticity values
and other endpoint specific parameters for each endpoint.
Peak and off-peak baseline calculation: In order to calculate
the baseline energy consumption for both peak and off-peak
periods, we considered for each endpoint the consumption
data that are associated with an average dynamic price equal
to the base price p0 only. Then, the peak (resp. off-peak)
consumption data are averaged over these periods to calculate
the peak (resp. off-peak) consumption baseline.
Base temperature calculation for various dynamic prices:
Base temperature for heating is the minimum outside temper-
ature in ◦C for which heating is not activated by a certain
endpoint for a certain retail price of energy (e.g., p1). This
parameter is endpoint specific and depends also on the new
dynamic price p1 that is applied, instead of p0, since this
is the price that consumers would pay and which could
determine whether to turn the heating on. Thus, for each
price pk(p0 = 0.1176£/kWh, p1 = 0.0399£/kWh and
p2 = 0.672£/kWh) that is applied and for each endpoint,
the respective base temperature for heating is extracted.
In a complete data set where sub-metering for AC consump-
tion would also be included and each dynamic price pk would
be applied for a sufficient number of times during the testing
period, the base temperature for heating for each endpoint
would be calculated based on the AC consumption data, i.e.
based on whether the AC is activated or not, and the outside
temperature. Base temperature for heating will be equal to the
minimum outside temperature for which AC is not activated.
However, extracting such information from our dataset was
quite challenging due to: (i) absence of sub-metering data (AC
consumption data), (ii) non-baseline prices (p1 and p2) were
applied a very limited number of times and (iii) endpoints
were located in London where gas is mainly used for heating.
Thus, we assumed that only in very low temperatures it is
possible that an endpoint will also use an electrical device for
heating, and we calculate base temperature as follows:
Starting with the base price p0 for which we had suffi-
cient data, we considered for each endpoint all peak period
temperatures for which the following two conditions are met:
(i) the dynamic price that is applied is equal p0 and (ii)
the consumption is smaller than peak baseline consumption.
Then, for each endpoint i, those temperatures were averaged
to calculate the corresponding base temperature for heating
BT 0i . Then, the base temperature for each one the rest of
the applied dynamic prices BT pki was calculated: (i) in a
similar way if a substantial number of data was available
and (ii) by using BT 0i as the reference temperature and
decreasing/increasing it moderately depending on whether the
new price was greater/smaller than the base price p0.
Peak and off-peak elasticity profiles calculation: Own-price
elasticity εi, weather sensitivity δi and the constant term ni
were extracted for each endpoint i and for both peak and
off-peak period by applying a regression model to equation
1. As input we used all peak and off-peak period data from
each endpoint, i.e. data for each day t of the training period,
regardless the dynamic price applied (could be both the base
price p0 and a price pk 6= p0).
Elasticity of substitution σi, weather sensitivity βi and
constant term αi are extracted for each endpoint i by applying
a regression model to equation 2. As input we select for each
endpoint the data that meet the following condition: the price
applied in the peak period is greater than the price applied in
the off-peak period that follows the peak period, ppk > p
op
k .
Note: We assume that dynamic prices are announced a few
hours before they are actually applied and thus, load shifting
is considered to take place only in the off-peak period that
follows and not the one that precedes the peak period.
2) Accuracy estimation: Based on the outputs from the
training period we assess the proposed engine’s accuracy.
To achieve this, we used a subset of our initial dataset
that includes data from 01/11/2013 until 31/12/2013 for 145,
randomly selected, endpoints. The aforementioned months
were selected since they are characterized by similar weather
conditions with the months considered in the testing period.
According to [13] load forecasting on the individual house-
hold level is a challenging task due to the extreme system
volatility as a result of dynamic processes composed of many
individual components. Home loads can be influenced by
a number of factors, such as: operational characteristics of
devices, behaviours of the users, economic factors, time of
the day, day of the week, weather conditions, holidays etc.
The forecasting accuracy at the individual level of each
endpoint i is determined by calculating the Mean Absolute
Persentage Error (MAPE) as follows:
MAPEi =
100
T
T∑
1
| L
t
forecasted − Ltactual
Ltactual
| , (3)
where:Ltactual and L
t
forecasted are the actual and forecasted
values of peak period aggregated consumption of endpoint i
at day t, T is the number of fitted points, i.e. in our case 61
days of the two-month period.
Extraction of forecasted values for peak period: The peak
period loads for each endpoint i and for each day t of the
accuracy dataset are projected by solving equation ?? taking
into account the calculated values of price elasticities, the price
that is applied pk and the average outside temperature T
p,t
i that
are included in the dataset. Similarly, we project the off-peak
period loads taking also into account possible load shifting
from the peak period by solving equation 2.
According to [13], the forecasting performance at the in-
dividual level shows much higher errors (20% to 100% and
even higher), and depends on dwelling lifestyle and regularity
of appliance usage as described above. In Figure 1a we depict
the calculated MAPE for each endpoint that was considered.
As expected, we observe that for the majority of endpoints,
the MAPE is lower than 50% whilt it exceeds 100% for only
a few endpoints. More specifically, 18.28% of users (23 out
of 126) have error below 20%, for 64.29% of participants (81
in total) the error ranges from 21% up to 70% and for 6.3%
(8 out of 126) the error is between 71% and 100%.
Aggregation on the other hand reduces the inherent variabil-
ity in electricity consumption resulting in increasingly smooth
load shapes, and as a result, the relative forecasting errors
typically seen at the level of substations have been quite
420 40 60 80 100 120
20%
50%
100%
200%
300%
400%
500%
600%
700%
Sorted Endpoint i in terms of MAPE
M
AP
E 
on
 th
e 
In
di
vid
ua
l E
nd
po
in
t L
ev
el
(a) Individual endpoint level
10 20 30 40 50 60
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
Day t of two−month period 
for testing CES model accuracy
M
AP
E 
on
 th
e 
Ag
gr
eg
at
ed
  L
ev
el
(b) Aggregated Level
Fig. 1: Forecasting accuracy during peak periods in terms of MAPE.
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Fig. 2: Forecasting accuracy on the Aggregated Level during peak period in
terms of MPE.
low in terms of MAPE (1% 2%) [14] and in cases higher
(12%-30%) [15]. Figure 1b presents the calculated MAPE of
aggregated peak demand of all endpoints in each day of the
two-month period used for testing accuracy. As expected the
forecasting accuracy substantially improved. More specifically,
18.33% of the days (11 out of 60) have error below 2%, for
70% of participants (42 in total) the error ranges from 2%
up to 8%. The days with high errors (>12%) are holidays
(Thanksgiving, Christmas and New Year’s Eve), which could
explain the comparatively higher errors.
In Figure 2 we depict the Mean Percentage Error (MPE) of
aggregated peak demand only when a dynamic price ppk > p0
is applied. We observe that all except one values of MPE
are positive, i.e. the forecasted peak load is greater than the
actual or in other words the forecasted demand reduction is
lower than the actual under a certain dynamic price. According
to this it could be argued that endpoints elasticities are
underestimated (end-users seem to be more elastic eventually)
IV. MECHANISMS FOR MANAGING DR CAMPAIGNS
BASED ON PRICE ELASTICITY
In this Section we introduce two mechanisms for running
DR campaigns: (i) a mechanism for implicit DR campaigns
that can be employed by a Retailer to estimate the now retail
price in order to achieve a certain amount of demand reduction
and (ii) a mechanism for explicit DR campaigns that enables
a DSO/Retailer to select the subset of consumers for possible
load curtailment, decide on the portion of load to curtail from
each one of them and calculate personalized rewards.
A. Implicit DR (price-based)
Initially, we assume that a Retailer has to attain a reduction
in the consumption by ∆QtargetKWh during the next peak
period. To achieve this target the Retailer has to employ a
new price pk > p0 to a set of N consumers with dynamic
pricing contracts. The Retailer would use the flexibility pro-
filing engine, for characterizing the demand function for each
consumer, and then by performing Algorithm 1 he can find
the new price pk that would lead to the desired demand
reduction. Algorithm 1 works as follows. For a certain price
the total demand reduction ∆Q is calculated. Then, the price
is increased/decreased, depending on whether ∆Q is smaller/-
greater than the desired demand reduction, respectively. The
algorithm ends when the desired demand reduction is met.
Algorithm 1 Mechanism for Implicit DR
set step, ptest = p0 + step, ∆Qtarget,
while ∆Q > ∆Qtarget do
set ∆Q =
∑
i(q
p0
i − qptesti )
if ∆Q > ∆Qtarget + threshold then
set pold = ptest
set ptest = ptest − step
else if ∆Q < ∆Qtarget + threshold then
set pold = ptest
set ptest = ptest + step
end if
Set step = (pold+ptest)2
end while
set pk = ptest
B. Explicit DR (reward-based)
We assume that a DSO/Retailer wishes to achieve a demand
reduction by ∆QtargetKWh during the next peak period, but
we focus on the case of N consumers for which a change in
price is not foreseen (e.g., with fixed-price contracts) and intro-
duce a consumer–selection mechanism for managing explicit
DR campaigns. In this context, in order to obtain a certain
amount of flexibility from consumer i, an appropriate reward
should be offered to her. A traditional way in microeconomic
theory for monetary incentives is to offer a payment that will
make her (at least) as happy as before the DR signal [12].
Figure 3 presents the Net Benefit of a single endpoint during
the peak period depicted for simplicity but without loss of
generality, for the case of linear demand function. In the peak
period, when the price is p0, the consumption is expected to be
q0 for a total charge given by the area D+E, and thus the Net
Benefit is the sum of the areas A, B and C. Raising the price to
pk results in reduced consumption qk and a total charge equal
to the area B+D. In this latter case, the Net Benefit is equal to
area A. Thus, NBbaseline = A+B +C, while NBnew = A,
and thus the Net Benefit difference for endpoint i is ri =
B + C. Assuming that the (inverse) demand function that is
characterized by the endpoint’s profile parameters is indeed
linear, we can compute each of the terms in ri as follows:
B = qk ∗ (pk − p0) (4)
5Fig. 3: A graphical representation of the Net Benefit of a single endpoint for
different prices during the peak period
C = (q0 − qk) ∗ (pk − p0)/2 (5)
Based on the above the reward that would result in a
flexibility that equals the flexibility obtained when price pk
is announced can be calculated as follows.
ri = q
pk
i × (pk − p0) + (q0 − qpki )× (pk − p0)/2 (6)
The proposed mechanism: (i) selects which consumers will
be targeted for load curtailment, (ii) estimates the amount of
flexibility that should be requested by each one of them to
achieve a certain amount of demand reduction ∆Qtarget =∑
j dqj , j ∈ K (with K we denote the set of selected
consumers) and (iii) calculates the DR compensation ri that
should be offered to each selected consumer if she ultimately
achieves the demand reduction. In contrast to the previous
case, where a uniform (for all consumers) retail price is
announced, both qi and ri are personalized. The pseudocode
of the proposed mechanism is presented with Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Consumer-Selection Mechanism for Explicit DR
set step, virtual price pi = p0 + step ∀i ∈ N , ∆Qtarget
calculate qpii , r
pi
i , R
pi
i =
r
pi
i
q
pi
i
and dqpii = q
p0
i − qpii , ∀i ∈ I
select endpoint i∗ = argminiR
pi
i
set ∆Q = dqpi∗i∗
while ∆Qtarget < ∆Q do
set virtual pi∗ = pi∗ + step for selected consumer i∗
calculate qp
∗
i
i∗ , r
p∗i
i∗ , R
pi∗
i∗ =
r
pi∗
i
q
pi∗
i
and dqpii
select endpoint i∗ = argminiR
pi
i
∆Q =
∑k
j dq
pj
j , j ∈ K selected endpoints
end while
Total Reward =
∑k
j r
pj
j
Note: In both scenarios described above, a third party Ag-
gregator could act as intermediate between the DSO/Retailer
and the end-users. In such a case, the Aggregator employs the
proposed mechanisms and helps the DSO/Retailer to achieve
the desired demand reduction in return for a compensation.
V. EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED MECHANISMS
We assume that a DSO/Retailer wishes to achieve a demand
reduction during the next peak period, which is equal to the
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Fig. 4: Comparison of the dynamic prices as outcome of the proposed price-
based mechanism vs actual dynamic prices applied during testing period.
total demand reduction that was actually obtained in each day
t of the testing peak period, during which a dynamic price
pk > p0 was applied. Thus, the DSO/Retailer employs the
proposed mechanisms based on endpoints’ elasticity profiles
and estimates the dynamic prices/rewards that should be
announced to achieve the desired demand reduction.
A. Implicit DR (price-based)
In Figure 4 we compare the dynamic prices for various
base temperatures (red, green, blue lines) as outcome of the
proposed mechanism. We observe, as expected, that the base
temperature plays a less significant role in for the particular
data set we examine, since as already mentioned endpoints
were located in London where gas is mainly used for heating.
In addition, we depict the dynamic prices actually applied
during testing period (black line). As we observe the dynamic
prices extracted by means of the proposed mechanism are in
most cases significantly lower than the actual prices. Taking
into account that endpoints’ elasticities are underestimated
(see Figure 2) we can reasonable expect that if the proposed
methodology were used by a Retailer, along with adequate
training, then an amount equal to the demand reduction
actually achieved could be attained by employing a lower
dynamic price. This would make the dynamic-pricing program
more attractive to end-users.
Please note that DR mechanism for implicit DR campaigns
during days 26, 27 of the testing period lead to higher
dynamic prices and rewards respectively. This could be due to
endpoints’ elasticities are underestimated (end-users actually
act in a more elastic way), particularly for days 26, 27 MPE
is significantly high (Figure 2).
B. Explicit DR
Due to absence of real reward values, in Figure 5 we com-
pare the total reward, extracted by means of the mechanism
introduced, that should be offered to selected consumers for
load curtailment in order for the DSO/Retailer to achieve the
desired demand reduction, with the total reward calculated
based on a naive approach, i.e. we calculate a uniform virtual
dynamic price that if announced to all participating end-users
the desired demand reduction would be achieved. Then, based
on this virtual dynamic price the respective rewards are cal-
culated. As expected our approach outperforms considerably
the naive method.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we developed in detail an approach for
managing manual DR campaigns. Initially, we described a
flexibility profiling engine that implements the CES model for
producing a profile for every end-user. Each profile reflects
demand for electricity as a function of multiple parameters,
such as environmental context/conditions, energy retail prices
at peak and off-peak periods and individual/group preferences.
An entity acting as an Aggregator can use these profiles for
calculating the expected flexibility obtained by each end-user
for a certain price, outside temperature and period (peak/off-
peak). In order to do so, we provided guidance on how to
calculate a) the baseline load and b) the base temperature,
e.g. the temperature above which the household needs no
heating. These steps, although not emphasized in the literature,
are important especially in the absence of sub-metering data.
Furthermore, we evaluated the accuracy of CES model when
forecasting the individual and aggregate demand in a very
challenging scenario. In particular, we used a publicly avail-
able data set from a dynamic pricing program that took place
in London, where electricity is rarely used for heating/cooling
purposes, while few new prices were announced to avoid
fatigue effects. We found that, despite the challenges, the CES
model achieves high accuracy compared to bibliography and
particularly on the aggregate case which is of high importance
when DR schemes are applied.
Our second contribution is documenting how these profiles
can be used by an Aggregator in order to define key aspects
of a successful manual campaign. Implicit or explicit. In the
former case the objective is to help a Retailer find a price
that, if announced to all customers under a dynamic pricing
contract, it would trigger a change in demand such that the
target flexibility will be met. In the case of explicit DR we seek
to meet the target flexibility requested by a DSO or Retailer,
while reducing the total cost of DR campaign in terms of the
monetary rewards. Given that users have a fixed tariff scheme,
we do so by gradually finding the set of users that are more
sensitive to prices and ask them to provide a certain flexibility
for a personalized reward, which will make the consumer (at
least) as happy in terms of net benefit as before the DR signal.
In both cases we see that the details of the DR campaigns
(dynamic price or monetary rewards) obtained using the
proposed mechanisms are more favorable compared with the
synamic prices actually applied and rewards calculated by a
naive method, respectively than the equivalent actually used in
most of the cases. Assuming a fixed markup for Aggregator’s
profit, the low cost of the campaign will render demand-side
management schemes that are more attractive for traditional
players in the electricity market, such as DSOs and Retailers.
At the same time by participating in DR campaigns, end-users
will have a more active role and enjoy either higher bill savings
(since dynamic prices in most cases will be below the flat
price) or an additional revenue stream from the rewards.
Overall, our work attempts to describe how the proposed
methodology is going to be applied in practice. In the future
we plan to evaluate the accuracy of the CES-based profiling
engine in real world demonstration activities performed in
three pilot sites of the Nobel Grid EU-funded project, namely
Manchester, Flanders and Terni.
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